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The iPhone 3G hogged its share of the spotlight over the weekend. The “twice the speed, half the price” phone sold upwards 1 million units over the weekend. But while most of the spotlight was focused on the new phone itself (and the difficulties experienced during the launch), I believe time will show the iPhone App Store — a iTunes-integrated online store that allows consumers to easily install a seemingly endless variety of games, utilities and other applications — was the Apple release most deserving of the weekend spotlight.

The new features (3G antenna, standard headphone jack, etc.) are improvements, don’t get me wrong. But they are the sort of sustaining improvements that customers expect, and they don’t exactly break new ground. I doubt whether these features alone can propel the iPhone to the level of success that Apple’s other “i” product has achieved. (If they could, you’d see a lot more buzz about the LG Dare and the Samsung Instinct).

It is the App Store that adds features in a disruptive way that other phones can’t match. With it, the Apple finally gives consumers a way to conveniently add third-party programs to their phones. (I’ve used both Palm OS and Windows mobile devices and can testify that until now this has been neither a quick nor a convenient process). In the same way that the iTunes music store made the iPod much more than another digital music player by allowing the consumer to easily buy, organize, sync and play music, the App Store makes the iPhone more than another smartphone. It turns it into a computer in your pocket, ready to be customized with the applications that you want.

How significant will the effect of the App Store be? Well, if the history of the iPod before and after iTunes is any guide, the effect will be enormous.

Prior to the release of iTunes in April, 2004, no more than 1 million iPods has been sold during any quarter. After it was released for Windows in October of 2004 (it was a Mac only release for the first few months), at least 4 million iPods (and as many as 22 million!) have been sold every quarter.

Of course, there are differences. Consumers already had well-established habits relating to buying and listening to music that the iPod + iTunes could build on. Similar habits relating to the use of third-party applications on mobile devices may not be as prevalent. And this time, the competition isn’t as far behind. Google is hard at work pushing its own mobile platform, Android, with headset makers and application developers (and might even be developing a Google phone). Also, incumbents like Nokia, which acquired Symbian recently, aren’t sitting still either. Both may be able to offer consumers devices that are as flexible and application ready as the iPhone in the near term.

In the face of these challenges, it will be interesting to see whether Apple will be able to repeat the success of the iPod. It is doing plenty right. But will it be enough?

The last couple of years haven’t been kind to former disruptive poster-child Sony. Yet the company has taken a series of actions that could position it to return to disruptive prominence.

What has Sony done? Is the company about to introduce new products or services that could be the building blocks of billion-dollar businesses? Not exactly. Sony has done something more prosaic—it got its core businesses under control.

It’s odd to suggest that this has anything to do with innovation, but in fact it's a vital part of the process. As we discuss in the first chapter of our new book The Innovator’s Guide to Growth, a core business that is in control is one of several necessary precursors to innovation.

Why? Well, when your core business isn’t in control, unexpected crises inevitably pop up. When those crises hit, managers necessarily and appropriately divert attention from growth initiatives toward making sure that the core business doesn’t go down the tubes.

That's what happened to Sony. From the mid 1950s to the early 1980s, Sony was an unstoppable innovation machine. It systematically launched about a dozen disruptive product lines, including the transistor radio and the Walkman.

But since the 80s, Sony’s innovation engine has suffered a long, gentle decline. It introduced innovative products like its Vaio line of notebook computers and its PlayStation line of video game consoles, but it rarely pioneered new markets.

Read the rest at Scott's Harvard Management blog.

Attendees of the Mobile World Congress in Barcelona earlier this year might have easily overlooked what could become a huge success. Modu, an ultracompact cell phone launched by the Israeli technology start-up modu mobile, might be the first truly modular phone – a technology with significant disruptive potential in the mobile communication devices category. However, highly relevant questions on consumers’ jobs-to-be-done and the business model need to be thoroughly considered for modu mobile to be successful in the marketplace.

The technology

In essence, the 1.41 oz., 2.8 x 1.4 x 0.3 inch device is a no-frills cell phone with a small screen and just a few buttons that can be wrapped in one of multiple “jackets” to become a more advanced cellphone (e.g. with a full QWERTY keyboard, a bigger screen, or individualized design). When merged with a “mate,” the modu becomes the core of an entirely different compound device with different performance dimensions such as a portable music player, a car radio, a GPS-system, a bike computer, a camera, or an alarm clock with a docking station that displays incoming text messages. The modularity of modu’s hardware and software allows its processor, memory, and wireless technology to run the compounded devices. 

The job

The modu is set for success only if it precisely targets consumers’ jobs-to-be-done and does not get distracted by the technological possibilities. Instead it should focus on specific circumstances consumers face during their day where the modu could be a winning solution: “Help me enjoy my commute” when getting to work and back, “help me access my emails while on the go” during the work day, and “help me become available for communication” when going out at night might be examples. Now, each of these jobs is already addressed separately by illustrious products such as Apple iPod, RIM Blackberry, and small form-factor cell phones by Nokia, Motorola, Samsung and others. 

At the moment, modu mobile’s answer to these competitors seems to be a lower price. The anticipated price of $200 for a modu bundled with two jackets that range in price from $20 to $60 each might differentiate modu from its respective nonmodular competitors. Yet, competitors could simply decide to sell for less, cutting their margins to outcompete modu.

The true power of modu’s technology lies in its modular architecture. Modu mobile can create a competitive edge by translating the device’s customizability into two distinct performance dimensions. First, modu's modularity can facilitate the individualization of consumer electronics -- a trend that predates its most common and unfortunately popular example, the personal ringtone. The second performance dimension follows the broad job “help me make my daily life easier.” This might sound more straightforward than it actually is, but figuring out how precisely to align communication technology with cross-architectural usefulness will be key for modu to challenge the iPods, Blackberrys and Nokias of this world. In this context, swapping the modu between multiple jackets and mates per day needs to be as quick and easy as its teaser suggests.

The business model

Modu mobile plans to launch its device with support from major cellphone carriers in Italy, Israel and Russia this October, followed by the U.S. and other European countries in 2009. Modu's business model focuses on selling the phone while licensing the technology to third-party manufacturers, who will build jackets and mates on their own. Manufacturers could profit from licensing modu’s technology by launching their products without a slow and relatively expensive licensing process with the Federal Communications Commission, because the modu is already a phone.

Modu mobile, in turn, keeps full control over the core component of what they hope will become as standard as flash data storage devices, the last undertaking of modu founder and CEO Dov Moran, who was formerly CEO of msystems inventor of flash data storage devices that was acquired by SanDisk Corp for $1.6 billion in late 2006). The two main advantages of licensing technology to other manufacturers for modu mobile are that with an increasing number of jacket and mate manufacturers the modu would be more and more cemented as a standard, and as other companies also strive for success, modu mobile hedges its risk of failure by potentially not getting the job quite done for consumers.

The future

Modu mobile has the potential to disrupt the mobile communication devices category. It can target overshot and/or nonconsumers (an interesting occurrence of a potential low-end and new market disruptive innovation), if it is able keep the low-price promise along with increased ease of use, or by introducing a new performance dimension around the device’s modularity and striving for increased customizability. The business model appears promising, if the self-reinforcing mechanism of initial success results in a large base of third-party manufacturers.

These are all big ifs, and I am really curious to see what the future will bring for modu.